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The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in
1955 proposed the Uniform Arbitration Act [hereinafter U.A.A.] A large
number of states have adopted arbitration statutes based upon the U.A.A. 8
The purpose of this survey is to explain the principles underlying recent court
decisions interpreting the U.A.A. and provide a framework for analyzing fu-
ture cases.'
I. VALIDITY OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
A. Application of Contract Principles
The U.A.A. provides that a written agreement to submit a controversy to
arbitration "is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.", Court decisions
determining the validity of an arbitration agreement are affected by the
court's application of controlling statutory provisions and contract principles.
2. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT §§ 1-25, 7 U.L.A. 4 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
U.A.A.].
3. Over one-half of the states have enacted arbitration statutes. Jurisdictions
which have enacted statutes modeled after the U.A.A. include: Alaska, Arizona, Ar-
kansas, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Ver-
mont, Virginia, and Wyoming.
4. See Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1987 Mo. J. Disp.
REs. 177 [hereinafter Recent Developments 1987]; Recent Developments: The Uniform
Arbitration Act, 1986 Mo. J. Disp. REs. 169 [hereinafter Recent Developments 1986];
Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1985 Mo. J. DisP. RES. 173 [here-
inafter Recent Developments 19851; Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration
Act, 1984 Mo. J. Disp. REs. 207 [hereinafter Recent Developments 1984]; Recent De-
velopments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 48 Mo. L. REV. 137 (1983) [hereinafter
Recent Developments 1983). The 1987 survey collected cases interpreting and applying
the U.A.A. decided between September, 1985 and September, 1986. The 1986 survey
collected cases decided between September, 1984 and September, 1985. The 1985 sur-
vey collected cases decided between September, 1983 and September, 1984. The 1984
survey collected cases decided between September, 1982 and September, 1983.. The
1983 survey collected cases decided before September, 1982. This article surveys cases
decided between September, 1986 and September, 1987.
5. U.A.A. § 1.
6. Id.
2
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1. The Writing Requirement
An arbitration agreement can be invalidated for lack of strict compliance
with the writing requirements of a particular state's arbitration statute.7 On
the other hand, a showing of compliance may serve as prima facie evidence of
the validity of arbitration agreements.'
The parties will be required to arbitrate when the written agreement is
clearly set forth. In Lake Plumbing v. Seabreeze Construction Corp.,' the ar-
bitration agreement provided that "all claims, disputes and other matters in
question arising out of, or relating to, this subcontract, or the breach thereof,
shall be decided by arbitration .... "1o After performance had commenced
under the contract, Lake Plumbing terminated the contract with Seabreeze
and engaged another contractor to perform remedial work. Seabreeze filed suit
in an effort to avoid "back charges" and secure damages for non-payment.
Lake Plumbing's motion to compel arbitration was unsuccessful.1
The appellate court reversed the trial court. The court concluded that
disputes in the construction industry are well-suited for arbitration as they
involve issues unique to the industry which require specialized knowledge for
resolution. 2 The court found the arbitration agreement to be "framed in bind-
ing, obligatory language"' s and held that "[w]here ... there is no issue as to
the making of an agreement which contains a provision for compulsory arbi-
tration, it is error for the trial court to deny a party the right to arbitrate and
require that the dispute be litigated in court."' " The appellate court reasoned
that the state's version of the U.A.A., 18 coupled with a standard, uncontested
contract which contained an arbitration provision gave all parties to the agree-
ment an affirmative right to arbitrate."
The failure of parties to include a written statutory notice requirement
within an arbitration clause in accordance with the state's arbitration act ren-
ders the clause unenforceable. In Hefele v. Catanzaro," the partnership agree-
ment which contained the arbitration clause was subject to the Missouri ver-
7. See Hefele v. Catanzaro, 727 S.W.2d 475, 477 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (failure
to comply with statement of notice requirement mandated by the Missouri Act invali-
dated the agreement).
8. See McKinstry v. Valley Obstetrics-Gynecology Clinic, 428 Mich. 167, 405
N.W.2d 88 (1987) (statutory presumption of validity accrues once evidence of agree-
ment is satisfactorily established).
9. 493 So. 2d I100 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
10. Id. at 1101.
I1. Id.
12. Id. at 1102.
13. Id. at 1101.
14. Id. at 1102.
15. FLA. STAT. §§ 682.01-.22 (1985).
16. Lake Plumbing, 493 So. 2d at 1102.
17. 727 S.W.2d at 475.
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sion of the U.A.A. 1 The Missouri Act required that any contract containing
an arbitration clause include a statement in ten-point capital letters stating,
"THIS CONTRACT CONTAINS A BINDING ARBITRATION PROVI-
SION WHICH MAY BE ENFORCED BY THE PARTIES."'" If the agree-
ment had contained the requisite notice language, the arbitration clause would
have been validated by the ratification of the agreement by partners who
joined the firm after the passage of the Act. However, without the required
language, the arbitration clause was unenforceable and invalid. The Missouri
court, while recognizing the relative harshness of this rule, noted the legisla-
ture's bona fide concern that entry into such agreements be voluntary. 0 While
the arbitration clause could have been valid, the absence of the required lan-
guage precluded a finding that the parties intended to absolutely foreclose re-
course to the courts. 1
2. Fraudulent Inducement
While both contract law and the U.A.A.2 provide that fraud and misrep-
resentation serve to invalidate an agreement, fraudulent inducement to enter
into a contract does not necessarily invalidate an arbitration clause within that
contract." To demonstrate either fraudulent or innocent misrepresentation
sufficient to invalidate an arbitration agreement, a party must show that he
acted in reliance upon such fraud or misrepresentation .2
In Wetzel v. Covenant Oil Corp.," an allegation of fraudulent induce-
ment in the execution of a limited partnership agreement containing an arbi-
tration clause did not prevent the clause itself from being valid and enforcea-
ble.' In Wetzel, a motion to compel arbitration was resisted by one of the
limited partners. He contended that the arbitration clause was invalid due to
fraudulent representations made by the general partner which induced him to
enter into the partnership agreement."
18. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 435.350-.470 (1986). Enacted in 1980 and effective for
arbitration agreements executed after August 13, 1980. The parties ratification of the
amended original agreement in 1983 made the original agreement subject to the Act.
Hefele, 727 S.W.2d at 475.
19. Mo. REV. STAT. § 435.460.
20. Hefele, 727 S.W.2d at 477.
21. id.
22. U.A.A. § 1. "A written agreement ... to submit to arbitration ... is valid,
enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
revocation of any contract."
23. Wetzel v. Covenant Oil Corp., 733 P.2d 424 (Okla. Ct. App. 1986).
24. McKinstry, 428 Mich. at 187, 405 N.W.2d at 97.
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The appellate court ruled that Oklahoma's version of the U.A.A." was
silent as to the effect of culpable acts on the validity of an arbitration agree-
ment.2 9 In upholding the validity of the agreement, the court adopted the rule
of Massachusetts s3 Arizona,s1 and the United States Supreme Court" which
recognizes that when attacking a contract, allegations of fraud will be insuffi-
cient to defeat arbitration otherwise agreed upon under the U.A.A."
The court noted several factors that were pertinent to its decision. First,
the broad language of the arbitration provision provided clear evidence of the
intent that arbitration be the chosen method of resolving disputes between the
parties." Second, there was no indication that culpable defaults and acts were
to preclude arbitration.'5 Finally, the object of the contract was accomplished
and the real controversy between the parties did not involve fraud."
3. Rescission
When a contract containing arbitration provisions is abandoned without
rescission, the arbitration provisions are valid with respect to disputes arising
before abandonment.' 7 In Coughlan Construction Co. v. Town of Rockport,"
the parties entered into a construction contract which contained arbitration
provisions. A dispute arose after work had commenced, and Coughlan subse-
quently filed a demand for arbitration. After this demand but prior to the
beginning of arbitration proceedings, Coughlan notified Rockport that it was
forced to stop work, and the contract was abandoned."
Rockport filed a complaint in superior court requesting a stay of arbitra-
tion on the grounds that the parties had abandoned the arbitration agreement
when they abandoned the contract. The court ordered the parties to proceed to
arbitration of claims made by Coughlan before the contract was abandoned.
Arbitration resulted in an award. to Coughlan. Rockport filed an unsuccessful
complaint in superior court seeking its vacation.40
28. OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, §§ 801-18 (1981).
29. Wetzel, 733 P.2d at 426.
30. See Quirk v. Data Terminal Sys., Inc., 379 Mass. 762, 400 N.E.2d 858
(1980).
31. See Flower World of Am., Inc. v. Wenzel, 122 Ariz. 319, 594 P.2d 1015
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1978).
32. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).




37. Coughlan Constr. Co. v. Town of Rockport, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 994, 505
N.E.2d 203 (1987).
38. Id.
39. Id. at _ 505 N.E.2d at 204.
40. Id. at , 505 N.E.2d at 205.
1988]
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The appellate court found no indication that Coughlan had agreed to a
rescission of the contract because it was forced to stop work. Therefore, the
court held that the arbitration provisions were in effect at the time Rockport
was ordered to proceed to arbitration.' The court placed particular emphasis
on the facts that there was no request for contract rescission, the dispute arose
prior to abandonment of the contract, and the party seeking arbitration per-
sisted in pursuing arbitration after the contract was abandoned."
4. Revocation
An arbitration agreement may also be invalidated by revocation. The
"revocation" exception applies only to cases in which the courts rescind the
agreement for reasons such as fraud, duress, or undue influence.' An arbitra-
tion provision will not fail based on revocation for lack of mutuality of assent
if the provision is a contract term formulated for some purpose other than
arbitration, and the contract as a whole has received mutual assent." Where
public policy favors arbitration provisions in written contracts, such provisions
will be enforced even though they appear in adhesion contracts."
These same principles controlled the validity issue in Hansen v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.' In this case, policyholders brought
suit against their insurance carrier under the uninsured motorist coverage of
their policy. The policy expressly provided for arbitration of uninsured motor-
ist disputes.'7 When State Farm moved to compel arbitration, the trial court
denied the request on the grounds that mutuality of assent to arbitrate was
lacking.' The court found the policyholders were unaware of the arbitration
provision, and arbitration had been imposed on them in an adhesion contract.4"
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the trial court's denial of
State Farm's motion to compel arbitration on unrelated grounds,5 0 but held
that the lower court had based its decision on erroneous theory.5
The supreme court construed the revocation exception in the Idaho arbi-
tration statute narrowly,5 " holding that an arbitration agreement could be re-
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Hansen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 663, -, 735 P.2d
974, 981 (1987).
44. Id. at __, 735 P.2d at 980.
45. Id. at , 735 P.2d at 980-81.
46. Id. at 663, 735 P.2d at 974.
47. Id. at ,735 P.2d at 979.
48. Id. at __, 735 P.2d at 977.
49. Id. at --. 735 P.2d at 980.
50. State Farm had waived its right to enforce the arbitration clause in the con-
tract as the motion to compel was untimely. Id. at _ 735 P.2d at 981.
51. Id.
52. IDAHO CODE § 7-901 (1975).
[Vol. 1988
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yoked only "for reasons such as fraud, duress or undue influence."53 Since the
policyholders had not raised any such issue, the agreement was held to be
valid. The court found that the lower court had misapplied the doctrine of
mutual assent. The court stated that the question of mutuality goes to the
formation of a contract as a whole and held that an arbitration provision will
not fail for lack of mutual assent when such provision is a term in a contract
formulated for some purpose other than arbitration, and the contract as a
whole has received such assent."
The supreme court found the adhesion contract argument to be "nothing
more than an argument that arbitration clauses in such contracts should be
held void as against public policy."86 The supreme court found the trial court's
adhesion contract rationale to be without merit in light of the fact that the
legislature had expressly stated that public policy favors arbitration provisions
in written contracts." The court reasoned that the legislature would have ex-
pressly exempted adhesion contracts from the provisions of the state arbitra-
tion act if it had not intended for such contracts to be enforced.57
II. WAIVER
Arbitration and agreements to arbitrate are favored as a means of non-
judicial dispute resolution. The courts will liberally apply the state version of
the U.A.A. to promote the policy of favoring arbitration."
If one party initiates litigation, the second party may seek to compel arbi-
tration in an effort to stay litigation. To defeat the right to arbitrate, the liti-
gating party may assert waiver of the right to arbitrate.59 Waiver is defined as
a "voluntary relinquishment of a known right."60 Some courts conclude the
key to waiver is intent.'e Whether a party's actions illustrate his intent to
waive the right to arbitrate is a factual determination for the trial court which
will not be disturbed on appeal if it is supported by evidence in the record."
Courts are willing to infer this intent when a party's acts are so contrary to the
right to arbitration as to bar him from now asserting that right."
53. Hansen, 112 Idaho at -, 735 P.2d at 979.
54. Id. at -, 735 P.2d at 980.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.; see IDAHO CODE § 7-901.
58. See County of Hennepin v. Ada-Bec Sys., 394 N.W.2d 611, 613 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1986) (held that Minnesota version of the U.A.A. will be applied liberally).
59. See Hansen, 112 Idaho at 663, 735 P.2d at 974.
60. See County of Hennepin, 394 N.W.2d at 613 (quoting Har-Mar, Inc. v.
Thorsen & Thorshov, Inc., 300 Minn. 149, 156-57, 218 N.W.2d 751, 756 (1974)).
61. Id.
62. Norden v. E. F. Hutton & Co., 739 P.2d 914, 915 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987).
63. Id. at 915 (completing discovery and confirming in open court the intent to
go to trial with knowledge of the right to arbitrate indicates intent to waive).
19881 253
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It is the court's decision whether a party has waived its contractual right
to demand arbitration. It is the arbitrator's decision whether a party has
waived its right to bring a particular claim or cause of action in the arbitration
proceeding." Thus, once a claim is found to be arbitrable, the court may not
delve any further into the merits of the dispute, but must leave the merits for
the arbitrator.65
A. Right to Compel Arbitration
1. Failure to Make a Timely Assertion
In Rosecroft Trotting & Pacing Association v. Electronic Race Patrol,
In.," a Maryland court of special appeals concluded that whether a party has
waived its right to compel arbitration was an issue for the court, and whether
a party has waived his right to bring the substantive claim in question requires
factual determinations and is an issue for the arbitrators. 67 The court made it
clear that these were two distinct issues."
The defendant in Rosecroft Trotting had filed a demand for arbitration of
its claims pursuant to the arbitration clause in the contract. Plaintiff sought to
enjoin arbitration and objected on the grounds that "the demand for arbitra-
tion was not timely made.""6 Plaintiff characterized the waiver or timeliness
issue as a question of fact as to when the wrongful act occurred, and whether
the specific act in question constituted the wrongful act charged. 7' The court
stated that "[t]his issue pertains only to the timeliness of the claim which is
the subject of the arbitration and not to the right to arbitrate." 7' The court
held that alleged waiver of the substantive claim was an issue for the arbitra-
tors to decide.7"
In Falcon Steel Co. v. Weber Engineering Co.,73 a Delaware court applied
three principles to the issue of waiver. First, any doubts as to arbitrability
must be resolved in favor of arbitration. 7 Second, to waive the right to compel
64. See Rosecroft Trotting & Pacing Ass'n v. Elec. Race Patrol, Inc., 69 Md.
App. 405, 413, 518 A.2d 137, 141 (1986).
65. See Falcon Steel Co. v. Weber Eng'g Co., 517 A.2d 281, 287 (Del. Ch.
1986) (citing City of Meridian v. Algernon Blair, Inc., 721 F.2d 525, 528 (5th Cir.
1983)).
66. 69 Md. App. at 405, 518 A.2d at 137.
67. Id. at 413, 518 A.2d at 141.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 411, 518 A.2d at 140.
70. Id. at 412, 518 A.2d at 141.
71. Id. at 413, 518 A.2d at 141.
72. Id.
73. 517 A.2d at 281.
74. Id. at 287.
[Vol. 1988
8
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1988, Iss.  [1988], Art. 14
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1988/iss/14
UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT
arbitration, a party must have taken action inconsistent with that right.7 '
Third, laches or equitable estoppel will bar arbitration through waiver only
when arbitration would be inequitable, such as where the opposing side has
lost relevant evidence due to the delay.7' A fourth principle implied by the
court is that a clause which causes waiver will not be read into a contract
when it is not required nor logically compelled. 7
The defendant in Falcon Steel was a general contractor who refused to
arbitrate with its subcontractor despite a mandatory arbitration clause in their
contracts.7 Plaintiff sought to compel arbitration. Defendant responded by
claiming, inter alia, that the plaintiff had waived the right to compel arbitra-
tion by failing to file for arbitration within the time permitted under the con-
tract.79 The defendant asserted that a clause in the primary contract with the
owner which made timely notice a condition precedent to arbitration was im-
plicitly contained in the subcontract, and that the delay rendered his claim
against the building's owner invalid (he was suing the owner for the same
additional costs for which the subcontractor was suing him).'" Thus, the de-
fendant argued that the plaintiff's delay in asserting his right to arbitration
was prejudicial and had caused them damages.' 1 However, the defendant was
unable to present any evidence that his claim against the building's owner had
indeed been rendered invalid.
The court held that the plaintiff had not waived his right to arbitration
since the plaintiff had not actively participated in a lawsuit on the claim now
presented for arbitration and had not taken other action inconsistent with the
right to arbitrate."s Since the defendant presented no evidence of his claim
against the owner being invalid due to plaintiff's delay, the court held that
such a delay would only constitute a waiver via laches or equitable estoppel
where the arbitration remedy would be inequitable, such as where relevant
evidence had been lost due to the delay. 8" Furthermore, such inequities were
an issue for the arbitrator and not for the court." The court also refused to
read the provision of the primary contract into the subcontract providing that
timely notice was a condition precedent to arbitration. The court found it was
neither an express provision in the subcontract, nor logically compelled by the
circumstances." On all these issues the general rule that any doubts as to
arbitrability must be resolved in favor of arbitration was persuasive with the
75. Id. at 288.
76. Id.
77. See id. at 285-87.
78. Id. at 283.
79. Id. at 287.
80. Id. at 285, 287.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 288.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 287
85. Id. at 286-87.
19881
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court."
The court in Hansen v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co.87 utilized
principles similar to those followed in Falcon Steel to find a waiver of the right
to compel arbitration. The court concluded a party can waive his right to force
arbitration if he waits too long to assert that right and acts inconsistently with
it." The court noted that arbitration provides a quick and inexpensive alterna-
tive to litigation and alleviate crowded dockets.8 Those policies are rendered
meaningless when parties proceed with the litigation process before asserting
their contractual right to arbitration."
The defendant (State Farm) had engaged in extensive discovery for
eleven months, including depositions and medical examinations of the plaintiff,
and extensive ongoing settlement negotiations." Only when settlement negoti-
ations finally broke down and it became apparent that plaintiffs would seek
"stacking" of the three insurance policies (which would triple plaintiff's poten-
tial recovery) did the defendant first seek arbitration under the agreement.
The court stated, "in short, when it appeared that things were not going its
way, State Farm wanted out of the litigation process.""2 The court held that
as a matter of law, the defendant had, by his acts, waived the right to enforce
the arbitration clause in the contract."3
2. Litigation
The court in County of Hennepin v. Ada-Bec Systems," adopted the view
that waiver is a "voluntary relinquishment of a known right" so that the key to
a successful claim of waiver is a showing of the intent of the party to waive his
right to arbitrate."5 In County of Hennepin, the breaching general contractor
and its sureties were sued by the hospitals and county." The sureties raised
the contract's arbitration clause as a defense, and the plaintiffs motion to
strike the arbitration defense was denied.' The sureties did not at that time
move to compel arbitration or stay the proceedings pending arbitration. Both
sides engaged in five years of discovery, with the sureties claiming their discov-
ery was aimed at other remaining parties and claims in the complex suit."
86. Id. at 287-88.
87. 112 Idaho 663, 735 P.2d 974 (1987).






94. 394 N.W.2d at 611.
95. Id. at 613.
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When the plaintiff's filed a notice of readiness for trial, the sureties moved to
stay proceedings pending arbitration of the claims pursuant to the arbitration
clause of the contract. The trial court held the sureties had waived their arbi-
tration right or defense by waiting over six years to move for arbitration and
by participating in discovery in the interim."
The court of appeals reversed the trial court. The court held that the
sureties' intent to waive or voluntarily relinquish their arbitration right had
not been shown. 1 "0 The court concluded that engaging in discovery did not
cause a waiver because discovery was consistent with the flexibility of the arbi-
tration process, and because the complex litigation was ongoing with other
parties and other claims in the suit.'10The intent to retain the right to arbitrate
was shown in the assertion of arbitration as a defense in the defendant's an-
swer which the court found to rebut the inference of waiver.
1 0 2
In Norden v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 103 the court stated that a party's right
to arbitrate is waived where the party acts inconsistently with that right, re-
sulting in prejudice to the opposing party."" A party's intent to waive this
right can also be inferred from his actions or inaction.10 '
The defendants raised the affirmative defense of an arbitration agreement
in their answer. 10 The controlling case law in the state held such agreements
to be void.?0 One month after defendant's answer was filed, the state supreme
court overruled earlier case law.'" This decision made the arbitration agree-
ment between plaintiff and defendants valid and enforceable. The defendants
continued to pursue litigation by engaging in discovery with full awareness of
the enforceability of the arbitration agreement.'" The defendants filed a mo-
tion to compel arbitration only after the trial court ordered them to comply
with a discovery request.1 1 The trial court denied the motion, ruling the de-
fendant's had "knowingly waived their right to arbitrate." '
The Colorado appellate court affirmed the trial court ruling. The court
reasoned that the defendants had acted inconsistently with their right to com-
pel arbitration by pursuing a course of litigation when they knew they had an
99. Id.
100. Id. at 613.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. 739 P.2d 914 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987).
104. Id. at 915.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 914.
107. Id. (construing Sandefer v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 44 Colo. App. 343, 618
P.2d 690 (1980), which held arbitration agreements in securities contracts to be void).
108. Id. (construing Sager v. District Court, 698 P.2d 250 (Colo. 1985), which
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enforceable arbitration agreement. 112 Furthermore, the court found the plain-
tiff would be prejudiced by compelling arbitration because the defendants had
completed discovery while plaintiff had not.' 1 3 The court concluded, "the ad-
vantage the defendants gained by judicial discovery is sufficient prejudice to
infer waiver of their right to arbitrate."'1
Case law indicates a party must take action inconsistent with his right to
compel arbitration in order to waive that right. The cases analyzed indicate
that it takes fairly extreme circumstances to constitute waiver. This is consis-
tent with public policy and legislation favoring enforcement of arbitration
agreements.
III. ARBITRABILITY
When parties disagree over what issues the arbitration agreement covers,
the court will determine the arbitrability of the disputed issues." 6 In determin-
ing arbitrability, courts look to the language of the arbitration clause and the
contract terms."1 Factors which support a finding of arbitrability include: 1)
public policy favoring arbitration; 2) state legislative intent favoring arbitra-
tion; 3) federal legislation and case law favoring arbitration, and 4) the broad
wording of many arbitration clauses allowing for arbitration of most issues."'
A. Scope of the Agreement
The applicability of Maryland's U.A.A. 1"8 was addressed in Board of Ed-
ucation v. Prince George's County Educators' Association."' The issue was
whether the Maryland U.A.A. applied to the review of the arbitration award
or whether Maryland common law controlled. The award in question involved
a collective bargaining agreement between the Board of Education and the
teachers. The teachers moved to have an unfavorable award vacated under the
Maryland U.A.A."s0 The court of special appeals vacated the award holding
112. Id. at 915.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. This is covered under two areas of the U.A.A. U.A.A. § 2 allows a court to
decide arbitrability when a party moves to compel or stay arbitration, and U.A.A. §
12(a)(5) allows a court to rule on arbitrability when a motion to vacate an award is
made on the grounds that no valid arbitration agreement exists.
116. See Donaldson, Lufin & Jenrette Futures, Inc. v. Barr, 151 111. App. 3d
597, 503 N.E.2d 786 (1987); Rosecroft Trotting, 69 Md. App. at 405, 518 A.2d at
137.
117. See Donaldson, 151 I1l. App. 3d at 601-02, 503 N.E.2d at 789-92.
118. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-201-34 (1984).
119. 309 Md. 85, 522 A.2d 931 (1987).
120 Id at 91, 522 A.2d at 934.
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that the Maryland U.A.A. controlled the grounds for review." 1
The Maryland Court of Appeals concluded the Maryland U.A.A. was
inapplicable. 2 ' The court noted that the state Arbitration Act, by its own
terms, applies only to those agreements between employers and employees
where the agreement expressly provides that the Act governs.' 2 The applica-
tion of the Maryland U.A.A. was beyond the scope of the arbitration agree-
ment as the collective bargaining agreement did not expressly state that the
Act would govern.
124
The court next addressed the applicability of Maryland Rule E2'. This
rule provides that once a final arbitration award is issued, the provisions of the
Maryland Act regarding court review are applicable even though the Act is
not applicable to the arbitration as a whole. 2" The court noted that a broad
reading of this rule would make the entire Maryland Act applicable in a court
proceeding in an arbitration to which the Act is not applicable.'2 " The court
rejected this broad interpretation of Maryland Rule E2. The court looked to
its previous rulings which narrowly construed Maryland Rule E2, making only
the procedural requirements of the Maryland Act applicable to common law
arbitration." Thus, the court held that Maryland common law controlled the
review of certain arbitration awards. 29
In Rosecroft Trotting & Pacing Association v. Electronic Race Patrol,
Inc.,1 0 the Maryland court limited itself to the issue of the scope of the arbi-
tration agreement.12 ' The case involved a contract dispute over a provision
which prohibited the appellant from making any communications which would
harm the business reputation of the appellee.13 1 Electronic Race submitted the
issue for arbitration but Rosecroft declined to arbitrate the matter. The arbi-
trator determined the claim to be arbitrable.""' Rosecroft moved to stay arbi-
121. Id. at 92, 522 A.2d at 934.
122. Id. at 96, 522 A.2d at 936.




126. Maryland Rule E2 reads:
After a final award has been made in writing in an arbitration to which the
Maryland Uniform Act is inapplicable, court proceedings may be had to con-
firm, vacate, modify, correct, or enter judgment on the award. In any such
case, the provisions of the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act concerning
such proceedings shall be applicable.
127. Board of Educ., 309 Md. at 96, 522 A.2d at 936.
128. Id. at 97, 522 A.2d at 937.
129. Id. at 98, 522 A.2d at 937.
130. 69 Md. App. at 405, 518 A.2d at 137.
131. Id. at 409, 518 A.2d at 139.
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tration, raising as an issue the applicability of the arbitration clause.1"4 The
trial court granted Electronic Race's motion for summary judgment.'"
The court of special appeals affirmed the trial court decision. The court
pointed to the broad language of the arbitration clause which provided for
arbitration of any dispute "concerning, pertaining, or relating to" the con-
tract.' 36 The court stated that under such broad language, "all issues are arbi-
trable unless expressly and specifically excluded. 1 81 7 The court found the cove-
nant not to harm business reputation was a contractual matter subject to
arbitration."
In Bethke v. Polyco, Inc.," 9 a shareholder's agreement gave Polyco the
right to buy Bethke's shares through a procedure which allowed both parties
to designate a purchase price over a series of fifteen (15) day time limits.14 0
The agreement also specified that if Bethke did not accept Polyco's valuation,
an arbitrator would decide whether Bethke's or Polyco's valuation was closest
to the fair market value of the stock."" After Polyco notified Bethke that it
wished to buy his shares and sent him the accountant's report on the valua-
tion, Bethke filed suit alleging faulty accounting and fraud. He sought a tem-
porary injunction as to the fifteen-day time limit because he could not name a
value for his shares.14
The trial court denied the application for a temporary injunction and or-
dered that all issues be submitted to arbitration pursuant to the shareholder's
agreement.'3 On appeal, Bethke asserted that the scope of the arbitration
clause was limited to determining which share valuation was closest to the fair
market value."" The Texas appellate court upheld the trial court decision. The
court ruled that "the question of whether faulty accounting and fraud are
within the scope of the arbitration [clause] ... of the shareholder's agreement
is an issue to be determined first by the trial court."""'
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 409, 518 A.2d at 139. The arbitration clause reads, "Rosecroft and
the Patrol agree that any dispute or disagreement concerning, pertaining, or relating to
the performance of the Contract from January 1, 1980, and thereafter shall be submit-
ted to arbitration by an impartial arbitrator selected by the parties." Id. (emphasis in
original).
137. Id. (quoting Gold Coast Mall v. Lamar Corp., 298 Md. 96, 468 A.2d 91
(1983)).
138. Id.
139. 730 S.W.2d 431 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
140. Id. at 432-33.
141. Id. at 433.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. (the clause read, "the question of which valuation was closest to the fair
market value of such stock, would be submitted to arbitration").
145. Id. at 433-34.
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The Illinois Court of Appeals took up the issue of arbitrability in
Vukusich v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp.'" The case involved a
franchiser demanding arbitration for a breach of contract with the fran-
chisee."17 The franchisee filed an additional claim alleging fraud in the induce-
ment on the part of the franchiser. The franchisee then filed suit in circuit
court against both the employees and the franchisor alleging false misrepre-
sentations on the part of certain franchiser employees." 8 The trial court found
that fraud in the inducement was arbitrable as to the franchisor, but that the
arbitration clause could not bind defendants or signatories to the
agreements."'
The court of appeals upheld the trial court's finding. The court concluded
that fraud in the inducement was an arbitrable matter, and as such, was not
open to challenge by the franchisee.'" In so doing, the court rejected the con-
tentions that: (1) Illinois law makes the entire contract void if fraud exists,
and (2) provisions of a contract are not separable. 16'
B. Effect of Res Judicata & Collateral Estoppel
These two doctrines may be employed to preclude arbitration. In Bailey v.
Metropolitan Property & Liability Insurance Co.,' 52 the plaintiff was injured
when an automobile in which he was a passenger collided with a utility pole.
Allstate, the automobile insurer, refused to pay the plaintiff any of the
$10,000 available under the underinsurance coverage. 53 The plaintiff submit-
ted the matter to the American Arbitration Association and was awarded
$7,500 of the $10,000 coverage.' 54
The plaintiff later made claims against Metropolitan Property as the car-
rier of underinsurance coverage on his and his mother's automobiles.58 Metro-
politan denied liability on two grounds, "(1) that the arbitrator's award pre-
cluded the plaintiff from further pursuing the issue of damages and (2) that
the plaintiff was also barred by reason of limitations in the defendant's poli-
cies. " 5' The trial court decided the limitation was valid, and because the
146. 150 I1. App. 3d 634, 501 N.E.2d 1332 (1986).
147. Id. at 636, 501 N.E.2d at 1333. The arbitration clause read, "[a]ny and all
disputes or controversies, whether of law or fact, of any nature whatsoever, arising
from or respecting this agreement, shall be decided by arbitration .... ." Id.
148. Id. The specific conduct of the defendant was alleged to be in violation of
the Franchise Disclosure Act, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121 , para. 701-764 (1985).
149. Id. at 637, 501 N.E.2d at 1334.
150. Id. at 640, 501 N.E.2d at 1335-36.
15). Id. at 638, 501 N.E.2d at 1335.
152. 24 Mass. App. Ct. 34, 505 N.E.2d 908 (1987).
153. Id. at 35, 505 N.E.2d at 909.
154. id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 35, 505 N.E.2d at 909-10. The limitation in both policies read, "[ijf
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plaintiff failed to exhaust the underinsurance available from Allstate, he was
precluded from pursuing a claim against Metropolitan.15"
The Massachusetts appellate court decided the case solely on the ground
of issue preclusion.5' The court concluded:
[a] party not involved in a prior arbitration may use the award in that arbi-
tration to bind his opponent if the party to be bound, or a privy, was before
the arbitrator, had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, and the
issue was actually decided by the arbitrator or was necessary to his
decision.15"
The court found this case did not fall into an exception to the general rule
"that a plaintiff is entitled to one recovery in a personal injury action for all
past and reasonably expected future losses and injuries."'' 1 Nor did the court
find any basis for preclusion under the Restatement. 1
someone covered under this Part [viz., Bodily Injury Caused by An Uninsured or Un-
derinsured Auto] is using an auto he or she does not own at the time of the accident,
the owner's Uninsured or Underinsured Auto insurance [here Allstate] must pay its
limits before we pay." Id. at 35, 505 N.E.2d at 910 n.l.
157. Id. at 35-36, 505 N.E.2d at 910.
158. Id. at 36-37, 505 N.E.2d at 910. The court cited the RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF JUDGMENTS § 84 comment c which provides:
When arbitration affords opportunity for presentation of evidence and argu-
ment substantially similar in form and scope to judicial proceedings, the
award should have the same effect on issues necessarily determined as a judg-
ment has. Economies of time and effort are thereby achieved for the prevail-
ing paTty and for the tribunal in which the issue subsequently arises.
159. Bailey, 24 Mass. App. Ct. at 36-37, 505 N.E.2d at 910.
160. Id. at 39, 505 N.E.2d at 911 (exception "when a new and unforeseen medi-
cal condition arises after the conclusion of the trial").
161. Id. at 40, 505 N.E.2d at 912. Reasons to deny an arbitration award preclu-
sive effect are set forth in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 84(2), (3), & (4)
as follows:
(2) An award by arbitration with respect to a claim does not preclude
relitigation of the same or a related claim based on the same transaction if a
scheme of remedies permits assertion of the second claim notwithstanding the
award regarding the first claim.
(3) A determination of an issue in arbitration does not preclude relitiga-
tion of that issue if: (a) According preclusive effect to determination of the
issue would be incompatible with a legal policy or contractual provision that
the tribunal in which the issue subsequently arises be free to make an inde-
pendent determination of the issue in question, or with a purpose of the arbi-
tration agreement that the arbitration be specially expeditious; or (b) The
procedure leading to the award lacked the elements of adjudicatory procedure
prescribed ....
(4) If the terms of an agreement to arbitrate limit the binding effect of
the award in another adjudication or arbitration proceeding, the extent to
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The Massachusetts appellate court earlier addressed the issue of whether
an arbitration award may be without effect on the grounds of issue preclusion
resulting from an prior judicial proceeding in Microwave Antenna Systems &
Technology, Inc. v. Whitney-Pehl Construction Co."' The first lawsuit was
filed by the subcontractor against Whitney-Pehl, alleging Whitney-Pehl failed
to pay for work performed. On the subcontractor's motion, Microwave, as
trustee of funds being held for the benefit of Whitney-Pehl, was brought into
the case. s6 Summary judgment was entered for the subcontractor against
Whitney-Pehl, and Microwave, as trustee, was ultimately found liable for the
full amount owed the subcontractor plus costs and interest.'"
Microwave, in an attempt to avoid liability, submitted its breach of con-
tract dispute with Whitney-Pehl to arbitration."' In arbitration, Whitney-Pehl
asserted that the prior judgment had a preclusive effect as to the amount Mi-
crowave was ordered to pay the subcontractor. The arbitrator found in Micro-
wave's favor after a hearing on the merits of the breach of contract dispute."'
When Microwave sought confirmation of the arbitration award in the superior
court, the court granted Whitney-Pehl's application to vacate the award which
Microwave then appealed.'"
The appellate court addressed the case in terms of issue preclusion. The
court cited the strong public policy in favor of arbitration as an alternative to
litigation, and the policy goals favoring issue preclusion as to matters previ-
ously litigated by the parties.' However, the court looked to Massachusetts
statutory law which provides that "a party to any suit involving an arbitrable
dispute is entitled to request and ordinarily to receive from the court a stay
pending arbitration."169 The statute indicates that if a party continues with the
litigation of an arbitrable dispute, they are ueemed to have waived any subse-
quent arbitration of that dispute.17 0 However, in the case at hand, the court
found the merits of the breach of contract dispute were never reached in the
Id. at n.6.
162. 23 Mass. App. Ct. 25, 498 N.E.2d 1059 (1986).
163. Id. at 26, 498 N.E.2d at 1060.
164. Id. at 27, 498 N.E.2d at 1060-61. Because the court found Microwave to
have knowingly and willfully misrepresented a material fact, judgment was entered
pursuant to MAss. GEN. L. ch. 246, § 19, amended by MASS. GEN. L. ch. 11,14, § 266
(1973), which reads, "[i]f a person summoned as trustee ... he shall be liable to the
plaintiff in the trustee process. . for the full amount due on the judgment recovered
therein, with interest, to be paid out of his own goods and estate."
165. Microwave, 23 Mass. App. Ct. at 27, 498 N.E.2d at 1061. Microwave as-
serted it did not owe any sum on Whitney-Pehl's behalf as Whitney-Pehl had breached
the construction contract. Id. at 26, 498 N.E.2d at 1060.
166. Id. at 28, 498 N.E.2d at 1061.
167. Id. at 25, 498 N.E.2d at 1060.
168. Id.
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first lawsuit, so the issues were found to be arbitrable. 71 The appellate court
entered a new judgment, confirming the arbitration award."'
In Kirk v. Board of Education, 1 7 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit addressed the question of whether failure to file a counterclaim in a
suit to set aside an arbitration award precludes further action on that claim." 4
Plaintiffs Kirk and Stuart, both males, were formerly employed as tenured
teachers at high schools operated by the defendant. Due to a reduction in work
force, plaintiffs were laid off while some female faculty members with less
seniority were retained.1 7 5 The teachers' union filed grievances with the de-
fendant, and the court ultimately ordered the parties to arbitration."' The
arbitrator reinstated the teachers, and found the dismissals based on economic
necessity were void because the parties' contracts required a public hearing on
the matter.17
7
The defendant filed an action in circuit court to have the arbitrator's
award vacated. The court granted summary judgment for the union and or-
dered enforcement of the award.1 78 The state appellate court affirmed the deci-
sion to reinstate the teachers even though the court noted the arbitrators did
not have this authority. 17 The court reasoned that because the arbitrators'
determination that the terminations were void was binding, the teachers were
rehired by "operation of law." 1" The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed and
reversed on the rehiring point.18
In Kirk, while the state litigation was pending, the plaintiffs received
their right-to-sue letters from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion and filed separate sex discrimination suits in federal district court." The
defendant moved to dismiss the claims on the ground that res judicata barred
the sex discrimination claims because plaintiffs did not counterclaim in the
prior suit to vacate the award. 8 ' The district court dismissed the suit and this
171. Id.
172. Id. at 31, 498 N.E.2d at 1063.
173. 811 F.2d 347 (7th Cir. 1987).
174. Id. at 351.
175. Id. at 349. The reason stated for this order in lay-offs was that they could
not supervise female students when the students were in the locker room. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 350.
179. Id.
180. Id. (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Bremen Dist., 114 Ill. App. 3d 1051, 1058, 449
N.E.2d 960, 966 (1983), affd in part, rev'd in part, 101 I11. 2d 115, 461 N.E.2d 406
(1984)).
181. Bremen, 101 I11. 2d at 122, 461 N.E.2d at 409.
182. Kirk, 811 F.2d at 350. The suits were filed under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 § 706(f)(1), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)
(1982).
183. Kirk, 811 F.2d at 350-51.
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The Seventh Circuit considered whether "the plaintiff's failure to file a
sex-discrimination count as a counterclaim in the suit initiated by the Board to
set aside the arbitrator's award precludes this Title VII action."' " Based on
the doctrine of full faith and credit, the court held that res judicata as applied
by the Illinois courts would control.'" The Illinois rule required identity of
cause of action in the two suits which meant the same evidence must sustain
both causes of action.1 87 The court found the two actions did not involve the
same evidence, and concluded the plaintiff's claim was not barred.'" The
court stated, "[w]e reach this conclusion regardless of whether we view the
prior action as a review of the merits of the arbitrator's decision or simply an
action to confirm or vacate the award, because the evidence necessary to sus-
tain either action would differ radically from that required to support the Title
VII claim."''
The cases discussing the effect of res judicata and collateral estoppel indi-
cate that courts are willing to find most issues arbitrable, especially under
broad arbitration clauses. An exception to this rule is in those uncommon in-
stances where statutory law expressly prohibits or the agreement itself specifi-
cally forbids arbitrability. The courts have established a firm role as the final
decision maker on the existence of an arbitration clause and the issue of arbi-
trability. However, the courts leave all other matters for the arbitrator.
IV COMPELLING AND STAYING PROCEEDINGS
The U.A.A. allows for the stay of any court proceeding pending the out-
come of arbitration. 9 ' It also authorizes the court to compel arbitration if it
finds an agreement to do so.'9" The application to compel or stay arbitration
must be made in a court of competent jurisdiction."
184. Id.
185. Id. at 351.
186. Id. at 351-52.
187. Id. at 352. In Illinois, "for res judicata to apply, there must be an identity
of the cause of action in the actions, and a final judgment of the merits in the earlier
suit." id.
188. Id. at 353.
189. Id.
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A. Compelling Arbitration
1. Statutory and Contract Rights
In Lake Plumbing v. Seabreeze Construction Corp.,1 9 3 a Florida appellate
court compelled arbitration based on the arbitration clause in a contract be-
tween a subcontractor and general contractor.'" The subcontractor brought
suit after the contract was terminated, and the general contractor filed a mo-
tion to compel arbitration.19 The court held that where the contract and a
Florida statute conferred the right to arbitrate and the right is properly as-
serted, courts should order arbitration.1" The court noted that arbitration is
especially appropriate in disputes involving issues that are "unique to certain
industries and which require specialized knowledge for their resolution."
197
2. Costs
The fees and expenses of arbitration, except for attorney's fees, are deter-
mined and allocated by the arbitrator. In Kessel v. Dugand,198 the appellant
appealed the circuit court's order compelling arbitration and directing each
party to pay half of the start-up costs of the arbitration.'" The appellants
contended that the circuit court had no authority to direct them to pay half of
the costs of instituting the arbitration.1" The Florida arbitration statute ex-
pressly provided that fees and expenses should be "paid as provided in the
award."201 However, the court of appeals concluded this statute did not settle
who should pay front money to commence proceedings.210 The court held that
logic required the party pursuing the claim to pay the initial costs subject to a
later modification in the award by the arbitrator.
*0 3
3. Temporary Injunctions
The decision to grant a temporary injunction concerning the issue of arbi-
tration itself or other matters before the court rests in the discretion of the
trial court. This decision will not be overturned except on a showing of abuse
193. 493 So. 2d at I 100.
194. Id. at 1101 (arbitration clause read, "[a]ll claims, disputes and other mat-
ters in question arising out of, or relating to, this Subcontract, or the breach thereof,
shall be decided by arbitration . . .
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1102; see also FLA. STAT. § 682.02 (1985).
197. Id.
198. 508 So. 2d 45 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
199. Id. at 46.
200. Id.
201. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 682.11 (1986).
202. Kessel, 508 So. 2d at 46.
203. Id.
20




In Hull Municipal Lighting Plant v. Massachusetts Municipal Whole-
sale Electric Co.,20o the court considered whether a preliminary injunction
could issue before arbitration when the contract required any dispute to be
arbitrated.'10 In Hull, Hull Municipal Lighting Plant (HMLP) contracted
with Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company (MMWEC) to
buy electricity at a reduced price. The parties entered into a contract which
required HMLP to make monthly payments to MMWEC to cover its portion
of the debt service on various projects.'"7 The contract required all disputes to
be submitted to arbitration at the request of either party.'" Pendency of arbi-
tration was not to affect the obligation of HMLP to make payments on the
bonds. 2os HMLP filed suit over MMWEC's investments in four projects in-
volving a nuclear power plant and stopped paying pending settlement of the
suit. MMWEC filed for an order compelling arbitration and sought a prelimi-
nary injunction to force payment.'10
In deciding whether to grant the injunction, the court balanced the harm
to MMWEC if the injunction was not granted against the harm to HMLP if
the injunction was granted, and the likelihood of MMWEC's prevailing on the
merits.' The court found for MMWEC on both considerations, and issued
the preliminary injunction ordering HMLP to continue making the
payments. 212
On appeal, HMLP argued the preliminary injunction was inconsistent
with the order compelling arbitration. 28 Since the court has to determine the
likelihood of MMWEC's success in order to grant the injunction, the court
was invading the province of the arbitrator.'' The court held that granting a
preliminary injunction did not invade the province of the arbitrator."15 The
court reasoned that although its evaluation in the preliminary injunction pro-
ceeding may influence the arbitration proceeding, the analysis was based on
abbreviated facts and law so that the arbitrator's final judgment could prop-
erly differ from the findings in the preliminary injunction hearing."'
204. See Hull Mun. Lighting Plant v. Massachusetts Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co.,
399 Mass. 640, 506 N.E.2d 140 (1987).
205. Id.
206. Id. at __, 506 N.E.2d at 144-45.
207. Id. at __, 506 N.E.2d at 141.
208. Id. at ., 506 N.E.2d at 141 n.3.
209. Id. at __, 506 N.E.2d at 141.
210. Id.
211. Id. at __, 506 N.E.2d at 142.
212. Id. at _ , 506 N.E.2d at 142-43
213. Id. at __, 506 N.E.2d at 144.
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B. Staying Judicial Proceedings
1. Third Parties
When considering a motion to stay judicial proceedings, the court may
stay the entire proceeding or merely its review of a severable issue."' As long
as an issue is identical to both proceedings, the court may stay its review of
the issue even when the parties in both proceedings are not identical. A stay
must be specifically requested or the proceedings will continue.'
Courts have also discussed certain prerequisites to de novo and appellate
review of motions to compel and/or stay arbitration. Illinois courts will grant a
motion to stay an arbitration proceeding if the issue of arbitrability itself is in
dispute.."9 One Illinois appellate court refused to review the denial of a motion
to dismiss on the grounds that it was not an appealable ruling absent an ac-
companying denial or grant of a motion to compel arbitration.'"
A Florida statute, using language virtually identical to the U.A.A., per-
mits a stay of those proceedings which involve an issue subject to arbitration if
an order for arbitration or an application therefor has been made.2 2" ' The stat-
ute also permits staying any particular issue in a proceeding providing the
issue is severable, subject to arbitration, and an order or application for arbi-
tration has been either requested or made.2' Florida courts have interpreted
this provision to apply even when the parties are not identical in both the
arbitration and the judicial proceedings so long as an identical issue is com-
mon to both."2
In 425 Florida, Inc. v. George V. Behan Construction,2 4 the Florida Dis-
trict Court of Appeals reviewed a lower court's denial of a motion to stay the
trial between a general contractor and an owner of a condominium project
pending arbitration of a dispute between the owner and a third party, the ar-
chitect."' The owner alleged collusion between the general contractor and the
architect in perpetrating fraud in this dispute.2" The appellate court reversed
the trial court and stayed only the fraud counterclaim pending resolution of
217. See 425 Florida, Inc. v. George V. Behan Constr., 497 So. 2d 1340, 1341
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
218. See Sand v. School Serv. Employees Union, 402 N.W.2d 183 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1987).
219. See Donaldson, 151 I1. App. 3d at 602, 503 N.E.2d at 790.
220. E. J. De Paoli Co. v. Novus, Inc., 156 Ill. App. 3d 796, 799, 510 N.E.2d 59,
60 (1987).
221. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 682.03(3).
222. Id.
223. 425 Florida, 497 So. 2d at 1341.
224. Id. at 1340.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1341.
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this issue between the architect and the owner through arbitration. 2 7 The
court found the other issues in the dispute to be severable and not arbitrable
as they involved both different parties and different contracts than the issue
being arbitrated between the owner and the architect.""
2. Other Claims
Under the U.A.A., the stay of other proceedings must be included in the
court order to compel arbitration."' In Sand v. School Service Employers
Union,"1 the court considered whether a specific stay was required under the
Minnesota arbitration statute (which is identical to the U.A.A.)." Sand
brought a grievance against her employer, the Anoka-Hennepin School Dis-
trict, because of her dismissal.2' Although the union agreed to process the
grievance, it refused to enter into binding arbitration.2' Sand then brought an
action in state court against the union for breach of duty for fair representa-
tion." The union interposed a third-party complaint against the school dis-
trict and moved to compel the school district to arbitrate."' This request was
granted." 6
During this time, the proceedings against the union were still pending in
district court. The case was ultimately dismissed under Minnesota law because
the time period for filing a Note of Issue/Certificate of Readiness or for a
continuance had passed.2"7 Sand appealed the dismissal based on her interpre-
tation of the Minnesota statute.28 Sand argued the district court proceedings
would have been stayed when the court ordered arbitration with the school
district. 2" The court of appeals held this interpretation to be erroneous. The
court stated that the wording of the statute requires all stays to be specifically
included in any order compelling arbitration.4 0 The court found no specific
language in the order staying the claim against the union.'' Nevertheless, the
court reversed the dismissal based on other grounds, holding that Sand's inter-
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. U.A.A. § 2.
230. Sand, 402 N.W.2d at 183.
231. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 572.09 (West 1986).
232. Sand, 402 N.W.2d at 184-85.
233. Id. at 184.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 185.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 572.09.
239. Sand, 402 N.W.2d at 185.
240. Id. at 185-86.
241. Id. at 186.
19881
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pretation was reasonable and the defendant had not been unduly prejudiced.2 12
3. Arbitrability
The issue of whether a claim is arbitrable is a determination for the
courts. In Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Futures, Inc. v. Barr2ss the court
considered whether a stay of arbitration should be granted where one party
asserts the subject of the dispute is not arbitrable. 4 4 The dispute involved an
employee's claim for compensation against his employer. The employee de-
manded arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause in the Board of Trade
Rules.246 The defendant, a commodity futures broker at the Board of Trade,
contended that the dispute over compensation raised by the plaintiff employee
was not within the scope of this arbitration provision . 46 The court of appeals
held that Illinois law permits a court to stay an arbitration proceeding on a
showing that there is no agreement to arbitrate.247 The court held that the
plain language of this statute indicates the decision of arbitrability is for the
trial court as a matter of law.'
C. Staying Arbitration
A court may stay an arbitration proceeding commenced or threatened on
a showing there is no agreement to arbitrate. " In Lambda Construction Co.
v. City of Alice,'20 a preliminary injunction stayed arbitration proceedings un-
til the issues between the parties were tried on the merits. The defendant
sought to enjoin arbitration, arguing that delay damages were not contem-
plated by' the contract and therefore not arbitrable.21 The court granted the
injunction pending a hearing to determine arbitrability."'5 The court of ap-
peals upheld this decision. The court based its decision on the trial court's
intent to speedily resolve the threshold question of arbitrability, and the in-
junction being granted solely to that end."'
There is an increasing trend by the courts to defer to arbitration where
242. Id. (relief from final judgment based on reasonable defense, reasonable ex-
cuse, or no substantial prejudice to the opponent).
243. 151 I11. App. 3d at 597, 503 N.E.2d at 786.
244. Id. at 602, 503 N.E.2d at 790.
245. Id. at 599, 503 N.E.2d at 788.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 600, 503 N.E.2d at 788.
248. Donaldson, 151 III. App. 3d at 602, 503 N.E.2d at 790.
249. See TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 224-25 (Vernon 1973); see also U.A.A.
§§ 3-4.
250. 729 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
251. Id. at 379.
252. id.
253. Id. at 381.
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appropriate. The courts will not order parties to arbitrate if an injustice would
result. Courts are interpreting statutes and making decisions which protect a
party's right to arbitrate provided that: (1) the right is clearly enunciated in
the agreement between the parties, (2) the agreement governs the dispute
before the court, and (3) a party correctly requests a specific remedy.
V. THE ARBITRATION PROCEEDING
The parties may specify in the arbitration agreement the procedures to be
followed in the arbitration proceeding.'" In the absence of any such agree-
ment, the proceedings must adhere to § 5 of the U.A.A. or the applicable state
U.A.A. provisions.
In Renny v. Port Huron Hospital," the court addressed due process con-
siderations within the arbitration proceeding." 6 The Supreme Court of Michi-
gan held that where an employer and an employee agree in advance that an
employer-employee grievance board decision will have final and binding effect,
such a decision will, nonetheless, be subject to judicial review when the em-
ployee-plaintiff alleges a lack of "elementary fairness" in the grievance pro-
ceedings." At the hearing before the grievance board, the plaintiff received
no notice of who the opposing witnesses were or what the complaint alleged;
was prohibited from presenting any evidence at the hearing; and was denied
the opportunity to be present during the proceeding.'" The court concluded
that a grievance process lacking elements of elementary fairness could be suc-
cessfully challenged on procedural grounds as failing to provide a procedurally
fair decision. 2"
VI. CONFIRMATION AND VACATION OF AWARDS
Courts generally confirm arbitration awards unless there are sufficient
grounds to vacate the award. The U.A.A. sets out five grounds for vacating an
arbitration award.2 6 0 The U.A.A. also sets out the procedure that the peti-
254. See U.A.A. § 5.
255. 427 Mich. 415, 398 N.W.2d 327 (1986).
256. Id. at 434, 398 N.W.2d at 337. Although the case did not involve arbitra-
tion as such, it did involve a grievance committee board which the court noted "should
be granted the same deference as that afforded an independent arbiter." Id.
257. Id. at 436, 398 N.W.2d at 338.
258. Id. at 438, 398 N.W.2d at 339.
259. Id.
260. U.A.A. § 12(a) states:
(a) Upon application of a party, the court shall vacate an award where:
(1) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means;
(2) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral
or corruption in any of the arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the rights of
any party;
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tioner must follow in order for the court to vacate the award. 61 Generally, the
U.A.A. requires the application for vacation to be made within ninety days of
delivery of a copy of the award to petitioner.26 2 In case of fraud, corruption, or
other undue means, the application shall be made within ninety days after
such grounds are known or should have been known. " In vacating an award,
the court may order a rehearing before new arbitrators or the same arbitra-
tors, depending on the grounds for vacation.' If the application to vacate is
denied and there is no motion to modify or correct, the award will be
confirmed.'e"
Under Section 11 of the U.A.A., there is a general policy of minimal
judicial interference with arbitration awards. Courts give great weight to the
arbitrator's decision .'" Every reasonable presumption must be indulged to up-
(3) The arbitrators exceeded their powers;
(4) The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause
being shown therefore or refused to hear evidence material to the controversy
or otherwise so conducted the hearing, contrary to the provisions of Section 5,
as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party; or
(5) There was no arbitration agreement and the issue was not adversely
determined in proceedings under Section 2 and the party did not participate
in the arbitration hearing without raising the objection; but the fact that the
relief was such that it could not or would not be granted by a court of law or
equity is not ground for vacating or refusing to confirm the award.
261. Section 12(b) states:
An application under this section shall be made within ninety days after deliv-
ery of a copy of the award to the applicant, except that, if predicated upon
corruption, fraud, or other undue means, it shall be made within ninety days
after such grounds are known or should have been known.
262. U.A.A. § 12(b); see also ME. REV. STAT ANN. tit. 14, § 5938(1)(c) (1964);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 572.19 (West 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-7"12(A)(3) (1978);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.13 (1983); TEX. REV. Cry. STAT. ANN. art. 237 (Vernon
1973); Wyo. STAT. § 1-36-114(b) (1977).
263. U.A.A.§ 12(b).
264. U.A.A. § 12(c) states:
In vacating the award on grounds other than stated in clause (5) of Subsec-
tion (a) the court may order a rehearing before new arbitrators chosen as
provided in the agreement, or in the absence thereof, by the court in accor-
dance with Section 3, or if the award is vacated on grounds set forth in
clauses (3) and (4) of Subsection (a) the court may order a rehearing before
arbitrators who made the award or their successors appointed in accordance
with Section 3. The time within which the agreement requires the award to be
made is applicable to the rehearing and commences from the date of the
order.
265. U.A.A. § 12(d) states, "[i]f the application to vacate is denied and no mo-
tion to modify or correct the award is pending, the court shall confirm the award."
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hold the award . 7 The burden of persuasion utilized by the court to overturn
an award varies from "demonstrating an objective basis,"' to "[o]nly in a
very clear case ... [of] fraud, misconduct, or gross mistake,"36' to "clear and
convincing evidence. 270 This high burden further supports the policy of giving
great deference to arbitration awards in order to discourage litigation.'
A party wishing to allege arbitrator misconduct and/or partiality as a
basis for vacating an arbitration award must object to the composition of the
arbitration panel at the time of the hearing, or his right to object is deemed
waived.' 7' Assuming no waiver, the party must prove the existence of facts
which would establish a "reasonable impression of partiality."" s The U.A.A.
§ 12(a)(2) statutory ground of "evident partiality" means "more than a mere
appearance of bias."' 7'
As previously stated, great judicial deference is given to the arbitrator's
final decision,275 as well as his decision to hear certain expert testimony and
issue sanctions.276 Even when the arbitrator commits an error of law, courts
may hold that he has not exceeded his powers, and uphold the decision.'
77 If
an arbitration panel makes a decision or grants an award that exceeds the
arbitration agreement, it can be vacated and remanded for further considera-
tion consistent with the powers conferred on the arbitration panel by statute or
the agreement.' 7' Courts have agreed that an arbitrator does not have the au-
thority to award punitive damages, as this is a matter left to the courts.' 7 '
However, one court allowed an arbitration panel to "suggest" the amount of
punitive damages a proper court should award without finding that the panel
exceeded its authority. 80 Further, all grounds for vacating an award must be
267. See Bailey & Williams v. Westfall, 727 S.W.2d 86, 90 (Tex. Ct. App.
1987); Wilson Bldg. Co. v. Thorneburg Hosiery, 85 N.C. App. 684, 355 S.E.2d 815
(N.C. Ct. App. 1987).
268. See Wilson, 85 N.C. App. at - 355 S.E.2d at 817.
269. See Bailey & Williams, 727 S.W.2d at 90.
270. See Texas West Oil & Gas Corp. v. Fitzgerald, 726 P.2d 1056, 1062 (Wyo.
1986).
271. See Wilson, 85 N.C. App. at -, 355 S.E.2d at 817.
272. See Bernstein Seawell & Kove v. Bosarge, 813 F.2d 726, 732 (5th Cir.
1987).
273. Id. at 732.
274. Id.
275. See Maine, 517 A.2d 58, 62-63 (Me. 1986).
276. See Golub v. Spivey, 70 Md. App. 147, 520 A.2d 394 (Md. Ct. App. Spec.
1987).
277. See Maine, 517 A.2d at 63 n.10.
278. See Law Enforcement Labor Serv. Inc. v. City of Roseville, 393 N.W.2d
670 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Wilson, 85 N.C. App. at - 355 S.E.2d at 818.
279. See Stewart v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 104 N.M. 744, 747, 726
P.2d 1374, 1377 (1986).
280. Id. at 747, 726 P.2d at 1377.
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addressed at the district court level or they are deemed to be waived and can-
not be raised on appeal."'
A. Arbitrator Misconduct, Partiality, and Bias
In Coughlan Construction Co. v. Town of Rockport,""' the arbitrators
made an award in favor of a construction company in a dispute over a con-
struction contract with the city. The city filed a complaint to vacate the arbi-
trator's award because of the possible bias of one of the arbitrators.2 83 The
arbitrator was an officer of a general contracting corporation and had nomi-
nated the attorney for Coughlan as general counsel to the Utility Contractors
Association.2" The trial court found the arbitrator's association with Cough-
lan's attorney to be a "professional relationship" not sufficient to indicate bias
or partiality.'" The appellate court affirmed the trial judge's findings that the
city had not met its burden of proof with respect to the arbitrator and "had
not provided the specific and direct evidence of fraud, corruption, and undue
influence or partiality ... necessary to overturn an arbitration ruling.'"
2
"
International Medical Centers, Inc. v. Sabates"s involved a motion to va-
cate an arbitration award for arbitrator misconduct. A physician brought a
claim against a medical center based on his termination as head of the medical
center's eye-care program for failure to maintain liability insurance.'" The
key issue at the arbitration hearing was the legitimacy of the medical center's
basis for terminating the physician's employment.' s9 After the hearing but
before the deliberation, one arbitrator placed a phone call to the physician's
insurance carrier to demonstrate the ease with which the hospital could have
verified the coverage.'" The arbitrators found for Sabates on all counts."
1
The trial court held that the arbitrator's action of placing a telephone call did
not require the award to be vacated on the basis of arbitrator misconduct."'
The court reasoned that this action did not prejudice the rights of the hospital
as the information gained from the call was already in the record." 3 The court
stated that while arbitration panels should not go outside the evidence
presented, the challenged conduct must sufficiently prejudice the rights of a
281. See Texas West, 726 P.2d at 1061.
282. 23 Mass. App. Ct. at 994, 505 N.E.2d 203.
283. Id. at , 505 N.E.2d at 205.
284. Id. at , 505 N.E.2d at 206.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 505 N.E.2d at 205-06.
287. 498 So. 2d 1292 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).





293. Id. at 1293-94.
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party to justify vacating an award.'"
B. The Arbitrator's Scope of Authority
In Hennepin County Ambulance Drivers Association v. County of Henne-
pin,"'5 the court of appeals held that the arbitrator's award was properly va-
cated because the arbitrator exceeded the scope of his authority.' A dispute
over a new employment contract was arbitrated between the county medical
center and a union representing paramedics and ambulance workers." 7 An
award was granted in favor of the union which allowed for a three percent
increase in pay and ordered the county to reinstate a twelve-hour work shift."
The court concluded that the award exceeded the arbitrator's authority
because it ordered the county to reinstate the twelve-hour work shift." The
collective bargaining agreement in question was governed by the Charitable
Hospitals Act,see which the court interpreted as not allowing the arbitrator to
determine the normal work shift.' In the absence of statutory authority, the
court reasoned that such matters are of inherent managerial concern, and the
arbitrator had no power to determine them unless the county consented to
arbitrate the issue.30
In International Medical Centers, Inc. v. Sabates,80 an employer argued
that an arbitration award should be vacated because the arbitrators exceeded
their authority.'" The employer contended that the arbitrator's consideration
of the employee's claim under the Florida Civil Theft Statute"' was an abuse
294. Id. at 1294. The statutory basis for the court's decision is FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 682.13(I)(b) (1983) which states, "(1) Upon application of a party, the court shall
vacate an award when ... (6) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed
as a neutral or corruption in any of the arbitrators or umpire or misconduct prejudicing
the rights of any party."
295. 394 N.W.2d 206 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
296. Id. at 208.
297. Id. at 207.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 208.
300. MINN. STAT. §§ 179.35-.39 (1986).
301. .County of Hennepin, 394 N.W.2d at 208; see MINN. STAT. § 179.38. The
statute did not give arbitrators the authority to settle issues concerning usual hours of
work, i.e. 12 hour shift.
302. County of Hennepin, 394 N.W.2d at 208.
303. 498 So. 2d at 1292.
304. Id. at 1294. The employer's argument was based on FLA. STAT. §
682.13(I)(c) which states, "(1) Upon application of a party, the court shall vacate an
award when . . . . (c) The arbitrators or the umpire in the course of his jurisdiction
exceeded their powers."
305. FLA. STAT. § 812.035(7) (1983) provides for the recovery of treble damages
to a person injured by violation of the statute.
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of power.80 6 The court held that the employee's claim based on the theft stat-
ute was properly the subject of arbitration.'07 The court further stated that the
holding was based on the legal principle that review of arbitration awards
should be extremely limited.'"'
The New Mexico Supreme Court discussed the issue of awarding punitive
damages in Stewart v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co.",' The insured
was covered by State Farm under an uninsured motorist provision of his pol-
icy. The policy provided that State Farm would pay to the insured any amount
for bodily harm or property damage that the insured would be entitled to re-
ceive from any uninsured operator of a motor vehicle. 10 The arbitration panel
awarded the insured $3,500 in compensatory damages and suggested $25,000
in punitive damages.8 1' Upon petition, the trial court confirmed the entire
award.8 1s
State Farm appealed and argued that the punitive damage award ex-
ceeded the arbitrators' power.8 1s The court concluded that the arbitrators did
not actually award punitive damages, but merely suggested an amount which
a "proper court" could find if they were persuaded punitive damages were
warranted.3" The court found this to be within the authority of the arbitra-
tors, and, noting the advisory nature of the arbitrators' decision, confirmed the
entire award."1
In McLeroy v. Waller,"1 the issue was whether an arbitration panel had
exceeded its authority by awarding punitive damages.31 7 This case was an ap-
peal from the denial of a petition to set aside an award in favor of a lessee in a
wrongful termination of a lease action.3'1 The lessee would not have been enti-
tled to punitive damages absent a showing of tortious conduct by the lessor."1'
However, Arkansas law expressly precludes the resolution of tort actions by
arbitration." 0 Therefore, the court held that the arbitrators did not have au-
306. City of Miami, 498 So. 2d at 1294.
307. Intl Medical Centers, 498 So. 2d at 1294 (based on a prior appeal decision,
see Sabates v. Int'l Med. Centers, Inc., 450 So. 2d 514, 518 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984)).
308. Id.
309. 104 N.M. at 744, 726 P.2d at 1374.




314. Id. at 747, 726 P.2d at 1377.
315. Id.
316. 21 Ark. App. 292, 731 S.W.2d 789 (1987).
317. Id. at 294, 731 S.W,2d at 790.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 296, 731 S.W.2d at 792.
320. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-511 (Supp. 1985) states, "[this Act [§§ 34-511,
531-532] shall have no application to personal injury or tort matters "
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thority to make an award of punitive damages.8 1
In Wilson Building Co. v. Thorneburg Hosiery,822 the court held that the
award of attorney's fees was not a subject for arbitration.' The contract
called for the owner to pay "reasonable attorneys' fees incurred by the con-
tractor for the collection of any defaulted payment."au" A statute provided for
reasonable attorneys' fees to be fifteen percent of the "outstanding balance"
due on the contract.32 6 The arbitrators' award included attorney's fees as well
as those amounts going toward the "outstanding balance.""" The appellate
court concluded the arbitrators exceeded their authority and remanded the
proceedings to the superior court to return the question to the arbitrators
solely for a determination of the outstanding balance due on the contract.
317
C. Refusal To Hear Evidence Material to the Controversy
In McLeroy v. Waller,828 the party seeking to vacate an award argued
that the arbitration panel improperly refused to postpone the hearing when a
subpoenaed witness left before being called to testify.8" The court of appeals
stated that the refusal to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause, and the
refusal to hear evidence material to the controversy so as to substantially
prejudice the rights of a party could be grounds for vacating or modifying the
award. 80 However, the decisions of the arbitration panel on questions of law
and fact are conclusive, and the award of compensatory damages would be
confirmed unless sufficient grounds were established to support vacating or
modifying the award.831 The court stated the burden is on the moving party to
produce a sufficient record from the arbitration hearing to demonstrate er-
ror. 82 The proceedings at the arbitration hearing, including the testimony of
witnesses and the discussion between counsel for the parties and the panel,
were neither transcribed nor recorded 88 The appellant failed to meet the re-
quired burden of presenting a sufficient record and the arbitrator's decision
was confirmed.88 '
321. McLeroy, 21 Ark. App. at 296-97, 731 S.W.2d. at 792.
322. 85 N.C. App. 684, 355 S.E.2d 815 (1987).
323. Id. at . , 355 S.E.2d at 818.
324. Id.
325. Id.; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-21.2(2) (1986).
326. Wilson, 85 N.C. App. at - 355 S.E.2d at 818. The arbitrators' award
included approximately $70,000 in attorney's fees.
327. Id. at __, 355 S.E.2d at 819.
328. 21 Ark. App. at 292, 731 S.W.2d at 789.
329. Id. at 294, 731 S.W.2d at 790.
330. Id. at 295, 731 S.W.2d at 791.
331. Id.; see also ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-108-212.
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In Golub v. Spivey,"88 the petitioner sought vacation of an award on the
grounds that the arbitrator refused to hear evidence material to the contro-
versy. 836 The arbitrators refused to hear testimony from Golub's expert since
Golub failed to meet the set discovery deadline for naming experts 8 7 The
court affirmed the arbitrator's decision to exclude this expert testimony based
on Golub's complete failure to comply with discovery and statutory law giving
the arbitration panel authority over discovery issues .3
D. Errors of Fact or Law
In Anderson v. Willey,3"' the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine consid-
ered whether a possible procedural irregularity during arbitration constituted
a sufficient error of law to justify vacation of the award." 0 The court vacated
the award when it concluded the panel erroneously determined the petitioner
had standing to sue."' The supreme judicial court stated, "in bargaining for
an arbitrator's decision, the parties bargain for the arbitrator's interpretation
of the law as well [and] a reviewing court is not empowered to overturn an
arbitration award merely because it believes that sound legal principles were
not applied."' 4 2 The pertinent statute set out only a limited number of factors
that a court could consider when reviewing an arbitration award."' Since a
procedural error of law was not included, the panel's award did not amount to
an overextension of the arbitrator's power.3
4 4
In a case decided a few weeks after Anderson, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine in Maine State Employees Association v. State,"' followed
the same .line of reasoning regarding errors of law.34 In this case, an em-
ployee's association brought a grievance on behalf of a librarian when her job
position was reclassified against her wishes. She had previously petitioned for
reclassification to a different job position, and her petition was not processed
within the 45-day time limit prescribed by the personnel statute."7 The arbi-
335. 70 Md. App. 147, 520 A.2d 394 (1987), cert. denied, 310 Md. 2, 526 A.2d.
954 (1987).
336. Id. at 160, 520 A.2d at 400.
337. Id., 520 A.2d at 400-01. Golub missed the deadline by over 45 days and did
not ultimately name an expert until the opposing party filed a motion in limine to
prohibit the hearing of any expert testimony for Golub.
338. Id., 520 A.2d at 401; see MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-05(c).
339. 514 A.2d 807 (Me. 1986).
340. Id. at 810.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 5938(l) (1980).
344. Anderson, 514 A.2d at 810.
345. 517 A.2d 58 (Me. 1986).
346. Id. at 63 n.10.
347. Id. at 62; see ME. REV STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 593 (1985).
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trator concluded the statute was "external to the Agreement" and returned an
award in favor of the state. 48
The Association petitioned the district court to vacate the award, alleging
as grounds that the arbitrator exceeded his powers by rendering an award
inconsistent with the statute.3" Since the arbitration award was based on a
collective bargaining agreement, the court stated that in order to find the arbi-
trator exceeded his power, it must find "no rational construction of the con-
tract that can support the award."8 50 The court also stated that "so long as the
arbitrator draws his decision from the terms of the collective bargaining agree-
ment, we are reluctant to disturb his conclusions.""' The court held the arbi-
trator's interpretation was reasonable and affirmed the award."'
In Texas West Oil & Gas Corp. v. Fitzgerald,"s the plaintiff sought to
have an arbitrator's award vacated based on a "manifest mistake of the
law." The suit involved a breach of contract between a corporation and a
contractor who was to construct and deliver a drilling rig. The contractor
failed to complete the rig based on improper specifications in the contract,,"
Arbitration resulted in an award to the contractor of the contract price less the
cost of completing the rig and the down payment."6 The corporation filed a
motion to vacate the award, arguing that it was a "manifest mistake of law"
to award full profit on a contract in which the seller failed to perform." 7
The Wyoming Supreme Court upheld the arbitration award. The court
rejected the contractor's contention that the corporation was precluded from
asking for vacation of the award because it did not assert one of the statutorily
enumerated grounds for vacating an award." The court stated that the statu-
tory list of grounds was not exclusive, and the court had the power to vacate
on a number of other grounds, including a "manifest mistake of law.""' How-
ever, the court did note that the moving party must prove "a manifest mistake
of fact or law" in the arbitration award by clear and convincing evidence." 0
The court concluded the award did not grant profit which was not properly
348. Maine, 517 A.2d at 62.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 62-63.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 64.
353. 726 P.2d 1056 (Wyo. 1986), reh'g denied, 749 P.2d 278 (Wyo. 1988).
354. Texas West, 726 P.2d at 1060.
355. Id. at 1059.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 1060.
358. Id. at 1061-62.
359. Id. (construing Riverton Valley Elec. Ass'n. v. Pacific Power & Light Co.,
391 P.2d 489, 500 (Wyo. 1964)).
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due under the contract.36 1
In Bailey & Williams v. Westfall,' e Westfall, a withdrawing law part-
ner, was dissatisfied with an arbitration award and sought to have it vacated
on the grounds of gross mistake.s e Westfall argued he was not awarded his
share of the firm's accounts receivable. e" The trial court vacated the arbitra-
tion award based on gross mistake.60
The appellate court reversed the trial court. The court stated that only in
a "very clear case" of gross mistake can an award be set aside .3 " An honest
judgment after proper consideration of conflicting claims is not a gross mis-
take.'" The court concluded an arbitration proceeding has the same effect as
the decision of a court of last resort, and a trial judge may not properly substi-
tute his decision for that of the arbitrator simply because he would have
reached a contrary decision. 8" The appellate court found that in the circum-
stances where error had been alleged, conflicting evidence was presented.8 'a
The court held the arbitrator's decision to be consistent so that evidence of
gross mistake was lacking.870
E. Award Would Not Have Been Granted by the Court
In Department of Public Safety v. Public Safety Employees Associa-
tion,37 ' binding arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement was
ordered. The Association filed a grievance on behalf of a state trooper as a
result of his discharge based on felony and misdemeanor charges. 72 The arbi-
trator rendered an intermediate award, stating that the discharge of the state
trooper was untimely as no hearing was granted before the discharge and or-
dered the discharge reduced to suspension without pay.3 78 After the trooper
was convicted of the charges in a criminal trial, the arbitrator issued a supple-
mental award concluding that discharge was then timely and appropriate.8 7 ' A
complaint to vacate the arbitration award was filed after the intermediate
award had been announced, but before the supplemental award had been ren-
361. Id.
362. 727 S.W.2d at 86.
363. Id. at 90-91.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 89.
366. Id. at 90.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 91.
370. Id. at 92.
371. 732 P.2d 1090 (Alaska 1987).
372. Id. at 1092.
373. Id.
374. Id. at 1092-93.
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dered.375 The trial court vacated the intermediate award based on gross error
and the arbitrator's improperly retaining jurisdiction until the criminal pro-
ceeding, and held the supplemental award was therefore without effect8 7s
The Supreme Court of Alaska upheld the arbitrator's decision. The court
stated that an arbitration award should not be subject to judicial review unless
there was gross negligence, fraud, corruption, gross error, or misbehavior on
the part of the arbitrator.37 Strong public policy favoring arbitration and the
concern that parties to a dispute would have little incentive to enter into arbi-
tration unless awards are allowed to stand influenced the court's decision to
follow a policy of minimal judicial interference with arbitration awards.37s
The court held that the arbitrator reasonably interpreted the collective
bargaining agreement and acted within his authority in continuing his jurisdic-
tion of the arbitration until there was just cause for the discharge.87 ' The court
further stated that it would be improper for a court to vacate an award merely
because it found its own interpretation to be better reasoned than an arbitra-
tor's interpretation, and that an arbitrator's interpretation of a question should
not be subjected to plenary review."8 As long as the arbitrator's interpretation
is reasonable in light of the circumstances, and the scope of the award could
have been reasonably foreseen, a reviewing court should not interfere with an
arbitration award.' 1
F. Validity of Award
In Harris v. Allied American Insurance Co.,s the court held that an
insured person was not entitled to confirmation of an arbitration award even
though the insurer did not move to vacate, modify, or correct the award within
ninety days.' 8 The arbitrators decided that the insured had sustained dam-
ages, but made no determination as to whether all or any portion of the
amount of the damages was due under the uninsured motorist clause of the
insurance policy.W4 In the absence of such a determination, the award was
held to be void and unenforceable because it was incomplete."5 The court held
the award lacked finality and, thus, could be attacked at any time.'"
The overriding principle in the judicial decisions regarding confirmation




379. Id. at 1093-94.
380. Id. at 1093, 1096.
381. Id. at 1096-97.
382. 152 III. App. 3d 88, 504 N.E.2d 151 (1987).
383. Id. at 89, 504 N.E.2d at 152.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Id. at 90, 504 N.E.2d at 153.
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and vacation of awards is that great deference is to be given to the arbitration
proceeding. This allows parties to rely on arbitration awards and promotes
finality of dispute resolution without litigation.
VII. MODIFICATION OF AN ARBITRATION AWARD
Attempts to modify or vacate an arbitration award must conform to the
applicable provisions of the state U.A.A. Courts are reluctant to disturb such
awards unless error is apparent or deviation from the U.A.A. provisions is
demonstrated to the court through the presentation of compelling evidence on
the record."'
The Supreme Court of Wyoming in Texas West Oil & Gas v. Fitzger-
ald,s held that an arbitration award may be vacated on grounds other than
those specified in Wyoming's U.A.A."' In Texas West, a corporation brought
an action against a contractor alleging breach of contract .3" The dispute was
submitted to arbitration, and a subsequent award favoring the contractor was
confirmed "except for the ... arithmetical error."'39 The Supreme Court of
Wyoming affirmed the modified award, holding that the appellant did not
clearly and convincingly demonstrate any grounds for vacating the arbitration
award.$"
VIII. JUDGMENTS ON AWARDS
Under the U.A.A., after an order confirming, modifying, or correcting an
arbitration award is granted, the court "shall" enter a judgment or decree in
accordance with its order.39 This judgment or decree is to be enforced in the
same manner as any other judgment or decree."
A. Judgment on Awards entered by the Court
Upon a motion to confirm an award by the prevailing party in an arbitra-
tion action, the court may either confirm, vacate, modify, or correct the award
that was granted.8 ' 5 Unless the award is vacated, the court will then enter a
387. See Texas West, 726 P.2d at 1056.
388. Id.
389. Id. at 1061-62. Other than the statutory grounds, the court referred to "be-
havior beyond the bounds of natural justice, excess of authority, or a manifest mistake
of fact or law appearing upon the face of the award." Id. at 1062.
390. Id.
391. Id. at 1059-60; the panels' calculations revealed an award of $467,000, but
the award stated $567,000.
392. Id. at 1061-62.
393. U.A.A. § 14.
394. Id.
395. Id. at §§ 11-13.
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judgment on the award. The ability of the court to alter, vacate, or modify an
award is dependent upon the aggrieved party's action in raising the issue,,"
The court must first determine the correctness of a challenged award before it
enters a judgment.
In some instances, a state's arbitration statute may provide the opportu-
nity for the losing party in an arbitration action to litigate the same issue in
the court system. In this case, instead of a judgment being entered, a new
proceeding is begun. The question then becomes one of whether the award
obtained in the arbitration can be used as evidence in the subsequent court
proceeding. The courts do allow the award to be used as evidence if it has not
been vacated by the court. Such evidence is presumed to be correct.8"
B. Prejudgment Interest
As a general rule, courts are unlikely to approve prejudgment interest in
an arbitration award. The court will take into consideration whether such in-
terest was contemplated or awarded by the arbitrators as well as any statutes
authorizing such interest.""
Post-judgment interest, on the other hand, appears to be available without
any prompting on the part of the arbitrators. The interest will be figured from
either the time the judgment is entered or from the time when the award was
granted by the arbitrators. The court makes this decision based on whether the
award was disputed by the aggrieved party."
In Coughlan Construction Co. v. Town of Rockport,'"0 the prevailing
party was seeking both prejudgment interest and post-judgment interest on an
award of $271,811 in a dispute which arose out of a contract for sewer con-
struction. 01 The plaintiff sought confirmation of the arbitrator's award. The
appeals court of Massachusetts noted that the arbitration panel made no
award of interest and mandated that fees and expenses were to be borne
equally.'40 The court concluded that prejudgment interest was not available
absent a specific award of such interest by the arbitrators.'"
The court was willing to allow post-judgment interest as the arbitrators
did not expressly prohibit it in their award.'" The problem before the court
396. See Ebitz v. Smith, 525 A.2d 219, 220 (Me. 1987) (failure to raise grounds
for vacating the award justified confirming the award).
397. See Golub, 70 Md. App. at 159, 520 A.2d at 400.
398. See Coughlan Constr.. 23 Mass. App. Ct. at 994, 505 N.E.2d at 203; Lucas
v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 403 N.W.2d 646 (Minn. 1987).
399. See Coughlan Constr., 23 Mass. App. Ct. at 994, 505 N.E.2d at 203.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 994, 505 N.E.2d at 206.
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. Id. at 995, 505 N.E.2d at 207.
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involved when to begin calculation of the post-judgment interest.?' The court
reasoned that if the defendant was appealing the size of the award, the appro-
priate date to begin computation would be the date the award became fixed
(i.e. when the motion to vacate had been denied and judgment entered against
defendant on this motion).'" In this case, the defendant was arguing against
the award on grounds other than the amount of the award. The court held that
the proper time to begin computing the interest was the date of the arbitra-
tors' award.'0
In Lucas v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co.,108 the Supreme
Court of Minnesota dealt with the issue of prejudgment interest extensively.
The plaintiff in this action was awarded $210,000 by an arbitration panel for
personal injuries he sustained in an automobile accident. By agreement, the
parties deferred determination of the prejudgment interest issue to the district
court.'' The district court concluded that statutory law did not provide for
recovery of prejudgment (arbitration) interest and the decision was upheld on
appeal.410
The Supreme Court of Minnesota considered whether the prejudgment
interest statute of Minnesota' 1 authorized prejudgment interest on arbitration
awards. The statute allowed such interest from the time of the commencement
of the "action" on certain portions of "verdicts" or "reports.""' In deciding
the statute did not allow prejudgment interest, the court concluded that the
term "action" as used in this statute meant "judicial proceeding" and did not
include an arbitration action."" This finding is based on the facts that histori-
cally arbitration proceedings have not been considered judicial proceedings,
and the Minnesota legislature had the opportunity to specifically allow for pre-
judgment interest in arbitration actions but failed to enact the legislation.""'
The court rejected the argument that, since the Uniform Commercial Code's
definition of "action" would include arbitration proceedings, such a construc-
tion would be logical in the instant case.'1 5 The court reiterated its position
that prejudgment interest is not available to arbitration victors under the pre-




408. 403 N.W.2d 646 (Minn. 1987).
409. Id. at 647.
410. Id.
411. MINN. STAT. § 549.09 (1986).
412. Id.
413. Lucas, 403 N.W.2d at 650.
414. Id. at 650-51.
415. Id. at 651. MINN. STAT. § 645.45(2) defines an "action" as "any proceeding
in any court of this state."
416. 403 N.W.2d 651 (Minn. 1987).
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The U.A.A. does not expressly provide for the granting of attorney's
fees. 17 The courts approach this issue by examining the nature of the dispute
and the underlying statutory provisions which would be available in a court
proceeding on the involved dispute."' Section 14 of the U.A.A. suggests that
an arbitration award should be treated in the same or similar manner as an
award in a judicial proceeding. A party cannot be expected to forego judicial
recourse and agree to settle a dispute by arbitration if they will not be eligible
for similar relief in both proceedings. The courts face a difficult situation when
a state's arbitration statute expressly allows or disallows attorney's fees and
the underlying substantive statute yields the opposite result.41" In resolving
this conflict, the court may view as controlling why the prevailing party is
seeking to have a judgment rendered on the award.4 20
The court of appeals for Florida used statutory construction to find that
attorney's fees can be recovered in cases where arbitration deals with an issue
in which attorney's fees would ordinarily be allowed. In Consolidated Labor
Union Trust v. Clark," the defendant was compelled by contract to arbitrate
a claim for medical expense benefits and prevailed in the arbitration proceed-
ing.422 The claim was for benefits under the Employee Retirement Income Se-
curity Act (ERISA). 423 The arbitration panel awarded the defendant $5,000.
The trial court entered judgment on the award and awarded attorney's fees.4"
The sole issue on appeal was the propriety of awarding attorney's fees.4 25
The appellate court first cited the ERISA statute which permits the court
to grant in any "action" reasonable attorney's fees and costs to either party. '2
Union Trust argued that an arbitration proceeding is not an "action" within
the meaning of the ERISA statute and, therefore, attorney's fees are not per-
mitted.4 2 7 The court held that an arbitration proceeding was an "action" under
the statute and that attorney fees are permitted.4 " The court reasoned that
the remedial nature of ERISA and the intended purpose of removing obstacles
417. See generally U.A.A. §§ 1-19.
418. See Consolidated Labor Union Trust v. Clark, 498 So. 2d 547 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1986).
419. Id. at 549-50.
420. Id.
421. Id. at 547.
422. Id.
423. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
(1974).
424. Consolidated Labor, 498 So. 2d at 547.
425. Id.
426. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) (1982).
427. Consolidated Labor, 498 So. 2d at 547.
428. Id. at 548.
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to enable recovery of benefits due participants justify this conclusion.'' How-
ever, the Florida Arbitration Code"s expressly excludes the recovery of attor-
ney's fees (a modification of the U.A.A.). Union Trust argued that this was a
confirmation action and, thus, should be governed by the Florida Arbitration
Statute.41 The court rejected this argument and concluded, "[s]ince the court
is always the appropriate forum to determine whether to award attorney's fees,
[citations omitted] all actions to confirm arbitration awards-no matter what
the underlying complaint-would be transformed into actions under the arbi-
tration code for which no fees are authorized, a patently absurd result."", 2 The
court confirmed and entered judgment on the award.
IX. JUDICIAL REVIEW
In an effort to protect private arbitration agreements, the courts have nar-
rowly limited review of an arbitration award. Once an award has been entered,
the courts give deference to the finality of that award.'
83
A court's scope of review of an arbitration award is limited to the statu-
tory grounds contained in the jurisdiction's arbitration act.43 The standard of
review used by the court depends on the particular statutory ground for re-
view. Where the basis of review is the arbitrator exceeded his authority, the
reviewing court must find objective evidence of impropriety in the record.'" If
the statutory ground for review involves fraud, the reviewing court must find
clear and convincing evidence of fraud.'"
The courts have recognized a valid need to review arbitration awards
under certain circumstances. Where there has been a gross mistake of law as
applied by the arbitrator, an award is subject to strict review. If the arbitra-
tion hearing is found to be procedurally unfair, the reviewing court may vacate
the award."-7
When parties agree to arbitrate, the process should be unimpeded by judi-
cial interference. In Koranda v. Austin Mutual Insurance Co.,"' the appeal
originated from a claim for underinsured motorist benefits for injuries sus-
429. Id.
430. See FLA. STAT. § 682.11 (1981).
431. Consolidated Labor, 498 So. 2d at 550.
432. Id.
433. Recent Developments 1987, supra note 4, at 229.
434. See New Shy Clown Casino, Inc. v. Baldwin, 103 Nev. 58, 737 P.2d 524
(1987).
435. See G. L. Wilson Bldg. Co. v. Thorneburg Hosiery Co., 85 N.C. App. 684,
.355 S.E.2d 815, 818 (1987).
436. See Foster v. Turley, 808 F.2d 38, 42 (10th Cir. 1986).
437. See Renny v. Port Huron Hospital, 427 Mich. 415, 436, 398 N.W.2d 327,
338 (1986).
438. 397 N.W.2d 357 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
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tained in an automobile accident.' 3 ' The defendant argued that since the arbi-
trator's award involved only an "interpretation of law, it was not binding on
the trial court if erroneous."" 0 In denying the claim, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals held that when parties agree to arbitrate and allow the arbitrator to
interpret the applicable contract provisions, "the arbitrator's decision is final
and will not be set aside even if the reviewing court believes the decision
erroneous."
441
Any attempt to interfere with an award by way of judicial review requires
that the reviewing court have subject matter jurisdiction. In Board of Educa-
tion v. Compton,'44 1 the action was brought to arbitration under the Illinois
Educational Labor Relations Act."' This Act establishes arbitration as a
means for resolving the disputes of educational employees. The Illinois Educa-
tional Labor Relations Act, as contrasted with the U.A.A., does not provide
for administrative review in the circuit court. The Act only provides for review
of Board action in the appellate courts.""' In order to have subject matter
jurisdiction, the court must be authorized in the arbitration act under which
the action is brought."'
The mere existence of an arbitration agreement does not divest the court
of subject matter jurisdiction. Hendrickson v. Moghissi"O involved a malprac-
tice action. The plaintiff had initiated the action in circuit court."" The peti-
tion in the case had been filed and answered, various sets of interrogatories
had been filed, and depositions had been scheduled.4"8 The defendant then as-
serted that the plaintiff had signed an arbitration agreement at the time of her
admission to the hospital. 44 ' The trial court concluded it was without subject
matter jurisdiction in light of the arbitration agreement.""
The Michigan Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court's ruling
and found that a trial court is not deprived of jurisdiction over a particular
claim in lieu of the existence of an agreement to arbitrate, but that subject
matter jurisdiction could only be removed by constitution or statute.4 1 The
court further held that the U.A.A. provides that arbitration agreements are to
be enforced by the circuit courts, but the Act does not divest the court of
439. Id. at 358.
440. Id. at 360.
441. Id. at 362.
442. 157 I1. App. 3d 439, 510 N.E.2d 508 (1987).
443. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. §§ 1701-21 (1985).
444. Compton, 157 Ill. App. 3d at -, 510 N.E.2d at 508, 511.
445. Id. at __, 510 N.E.2d at 511.
446. 158 Mich. App. 290, 404 N.W.2d 728 (1987).
447. Id. at 293, 404 N.W.2d at 729.
448. Id.
449. Id.
450. Id. at 295, 404 N.W.2d at 730.
451. Id. at 295, 404 N.W.2d at 731.
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jurisdiction to hear malpractice claims. 452 In Hendrickson, the court remanded
the case to allow the trial court to decide if the defendant had timely asserted
the existence of an arbitration agreement.
4
'"
A court's scope of review of an arbitration award is limited to the statu-
tory grounds contained in the jurisdiction's arbitration act. In New Shy Clown
Casino, Inc. v. Baldwin,"' a Nevada district court modified the arbitrators'
award by looking to the lease agreement between the parties. The lease agree-
ment stated that in any dispute submitted to arbitration, the "successful
party" shall be entitled to attorney's fees.' 55 The dispute which eventually
went to arbitration involved the refund of part of a security deposit worth
approximately $220,000. The arbitrators awarded over $137,000 of the deposit
to the Baldwins and the remaining balance to the casino. 4" The arbitrators
specified in the award that each party would be responsible for their attorney's
fees. 457 This decision reflected the arbitrators' conclusion that neither party
was entirely successful. 4 " After contacting the arbitrators and receiving con-
firmation from them that the lease provision controlled attorney's fees, the dis-
trict court concluded the Baldwins were the "successful party" and modified
the award by granting them attorney's fees.'
The Nevada Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision. 4 60 The
court held that the district court's award was not within the scope of review of
an arbitrator's award as contained in the state's arbitration act..4 " In the ab-
sence of a statutorily granted scope of review, the district court had no juris-
diction to modify the award.''
When a court has statutory grounds to review an award, the standard of
review used by the court depends on the particular ground for review. If the
statutory ground for review of an award involves the arbitrator exceeding his
power, the reviewing court must find objective evidence in the record that the
arbitrator did exceed his authority in some respect. If the statutory ground for
review of an award involves fraud in procuring the award, the reviewing court
must find clear and convincing evidence of fraud.
452. Id.
453. Id. at 299, 404 N.W.2d at 732.
454. 103 Nev. at 58, 737 P.2d at 524.






461. Id. The pertinent sections of the arbitration act adopted by Nevada are
identical in wording to the U.A.A. In NEv. REV. STAT. § 38.145 (1969), the statute
prescribes when a district court may vacate an award. NEV. REV. STAT. § 38.155
prescribes when a district court shall modify or correct an award.
462. Baldwin, 103 Nev. at - , 757 P.2d 525
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In Foster v. Turley,'" the district court overturned the arbitrators' award
based on the finding that Turley failed to disclose material facts to the arbitra-
tor."" Turley and Foster had entered into an agreement whereby Turley
would sell Foster an undivided half interest in unpatented mining claims. The
court found that Turley had failed to disclose to Foster or the arbitrators that
he had relocated certain mining claims under his name. The district court's
decision to overturn the award was apparently based on the conclusion the
award had been procured by fraud and was subject to being vacated.4 "6 Turley
appealed this decision.
On appeal, the court stated that the proper standard of review for a court
asked to vacate an award for fraud requires clear and convincing evidence
establishing fraud." With regard to the relocation of the mining claims, the
court of appeals pointed out that the relocations had been filed in the public
land records with the appropriate federal agency, and that the relocations were
covered by an after-acquired property clause in the contract which protected
Foster's interests.4" In light of these facts and the district court's failure to
state whether it found clear and convincing evidence of fraud, the court of
appeals remanded the case to be decided under the proper standard.'"
If the arbitration hearing is found to be procedurally unfair by the re-
viewing court, the court may vacate the award. In Renny v. Port Huron Hos-
pital,4"6 a nurse contested her discharge from the hospital as being without
just cause. The plaintiff filed the action in the circuit court and submitted the
question of "just cause" to the jury for determination.' 7 0 The Michigan Su-
preme Court found that the arbitration hearing did not comport to standards
of "elementary fairness" since the plaintiff was not given proper notice as to
what the complaint was or who the witnesses were against her.'7 1 Further-
more, "elementary fairness" was violated as the plaintiff was not given the
opportunity to present witnesses or be present at the hearing.' 2 The court
concluded a lack of elementary fairness in the hearing procedure entitled the
claimant to submit the merits of her claim to a court for judicial review.' 7
The cases dealing with judicial review of arbitration awards indicate a
clear attempt by the courts to further the public policy of promoting arbitra-
463. 808 F.2d at 38.
464. Id. at 40.
465. Id. at 40, 42. The reported decision does not state that the New Mexico
district court vacated the award for fraud. However, the court of appeals frames its
decision in these terms and evaluates the district court's decision in these terms.
466. Id. at 42.
467. Id.
468. Id.
469. 427 Mich. at 415, 398 N.W.2d at 327.
470. Id. at 417, 398 N.W.2d at 329.
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tion. The courts have narrowly limited review of arbitration awards in an ef-
fort to promote and protect arbitration.
X. PREEMPTION
Arbitration within the federal context raises complex choice-of-law ques-
tions to be answered by a court. Generally, procedural provisions of the state
U.A.A. will be applied when arbitration issues involve conflicting federal law.
Substantive issues pertaining to arbitration in a federal court will be governed
by federal law.
Although McClellan v. Barrath Construction"7"' involved an action
brought pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, the Missouri court found the
state U.A.A. persuasive in determining the appealability of an order to compel
arbitration."7 The plaintiff's motion to compel arbitration was granted by the
trial court and the defendant immediately appealed.' 7 The appellate court
dismissed the appeal pursuant to § 435.440 of the Missouri U.A.A. because it
found that an order compelling arbitration is not a final appealable order as it
does not dispose of all parties and issues in the case.477 The court discussed the
interaction between the federal act and state act and stated, "[a]lthough the
arbitration ordered here is under the federal rather than the Missouri act, we
find § 435.440 persuasive because we believe the appealability of a state court
order compelling arbitration should be uniformly determined irrespective of
which statute grants the right to arbitrate."'
'18
By contrast, in Webb v. R. Rowland & Co.,47' a federal appellate court in
Missouri held that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted the application of
the Missouri U.A.A. when an arbitration agreement was subject to "interpre-
tation" and "construction."' 6 The plaintiffs brought an action against the de-
fendant-brokerage firm under a contract containing a choice-of-law clause di-
recting resolution of disputes under Missouri's version of the U.A.A.' 8 '
However, the court held that since the contract was a "transaction involving
commerce", it was subject to the Federal Arbitration Act.'8 2
474. 725 S.W.2d 656 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
475. Id.
476. Id. at 657.
477. Id. at 658.
478. Id.
479. 800 F.2d 803 (8th Cir. 1986).
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